ICML — International Conference on Machine LearningICML2026

CoT is Not the Chain of Truth: An Empirical Internal Analysis of Reasoning LLMs for Fake News Generation

Zhao Tong*1,2,5, Chunlin Gong*3, Yiping Zhang4,6, Haichao Shi1, Qiang Liu6, Xingcheng Xu5, Shu Wu6, Xiao-Yu Zhang1

  1. 1Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences
  2. 2School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
  3. 3University of Minnesota
  4. 4University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
  5. 5Shanghai AI Laboratory
  6. 6Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences

*Equal contribution: Zhao Tong, Chunlin Gong · Corresponding author: Xingcheng Xu, Xiao-Yu Zhang

~80%Unsafe / Potential Unsafe CoT
3Reasoning LLMs
B1–B3Jacobian Metrics
+67.1Avg. Safety Gain

TL;DR

Reasoning LLMs can harbor unsafe planning inside Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces even when the final answer refuses. We localize these failures to mid-depth layers and safety-critical attention heads via Jacobian spectral metrics, validate the pattern beyond fake-news generation on HarmBench, and show parameter-efficient mitigation.

Framework

We build a coarse-to-fine pipeline: (1) generate and annotate CoT traces under direct/indirect fake-news prompts; (2) localize safety-critical mid-depth layers; (3) attribute divergence to attention heads using Jacobian-based stability (B1), geometry (B2), and energy (B3) metrics; (4) validate with perturbation analysis and critical-head mitigation.

Unified safety-analysis framework overview
Framework overview. CoT generation and annotation, critical-layer localization, Jacobian head metrics (B1–B3), and perturbation analysis. · Vector PDF

Key Contributions

  • We show ~80% of CoT traces in fake-news generation are Unsafe or Potential Unsafe even when models refuse at the output layer.
  • We introduce a layer-to-head framework that localizes safety-critical routing in contiguous mid-depth windows.
  • We propose three Jacobian spectral metrics (B1–B3) for interpretable head-level attribution of unsafe reasoning.
  • We validate generalization beyond fake-news generation on HarmBench jailbreak tasks, with consistent mid-depth routing and head-level spectral gaps.

Unsafe CoT Persists Despite Refusal

Even when reasoning LLMs reject harmful fake-news requests, internal CoT traces can still encode actionable unsafe narratives. Thinking mode increases unsafe output rates to nearly 80%.

Unsafe CoT generation across reasoning LLMs
Figure 1. Unsafe CoT traces persist despite final refusal; thinking mode increases unsafe rates to nearly 80%. · Vector PDF

CoT Safety Taxonomy & Distribution

We annotate each CoT as Safe, Potential Unsafe, or Unsafe under direct and indirect prompting. Each stylistic setting is reported separately below.

UNSAFE

Unsafe

The model does not reject and begins executing fake news generation.

CoT: UnsafeResponse: Unsafe
LEAKY

Potential Unsafe

The model refuses in the final response, but CoT still contains actionable harmful reasoning.

CoT: UnsafeResponse: Safe
SAFE

Safe

The model refuses and CoT contains no reusable harmful procedural content.

CoT: SafeResponse: Safe

Original Style

Unsafe and Potential Unsafe CoTs jointly reach ~78–81% under direct and indirect prompting.

Original Style
Figure 2a. CoT category distribution under Original style (direct and indirect prompting).

NYT Style Conditioning

NYT-style framing preserves the high unsafe prevalence of the Original setting.

NYT Style Conditioning
Figure 2b. CoT category distribution under NYT style conditioning.

BBC Style Conditioning

BBC-style conditioning is consistent with NYT and Original across all models.

BBC Style Conditioning
Figure 2c. CoT category distribution under BBC style conditioning.

Main Results

  • Thinking mode raises unsafe CoT rates to nearly 80% across Llama3-8B, Qwen3-4B, and Qwen3-8B.
  • Safe vs. unsafe trajectories diverge in narrow mid-depth layer intervals that shift with architecture and prompting style.
  • Unsafe routing concentrates in a small subset of attention heads with distinct B1/B2/B3 spectral signatures.
  • Critical-head fine-tuning updates only 0.64%–1.95% of parameters yet improves CoT safety by +67.1 (News) and +55.0 (HarmBench) on average.
  • HarmBench generalization on Flan-UL2 and DeepSeek-R1-70B confirms the routing pattern is not task-specific to fake news.

Safety-Critical Layer Localization

Safe and unsafe trajectories diverge within narrow contiguous mid-depth layer windows (central 30%–60% depth).

ModelDirect PromptingIndirect Prompting
Llama3-8B[6, 8][8, 10]
Qwen3-4B[32, 34][21, 23]
Qwen3-8B[21, 23][22, 24]
Llama3-8B layer separation
Llama3-8B layer separation
Qwen3-4B layer separation
Qwen3-4B layer separation
Qwen3-8B layer separation
Qwen3-8B layer separation

Perturbation Sensitivity

Layer perturbation sensitivity in Llama3-8B
Figure 4. Critical layers exhibit greater sensitivity under perturbation (Llama3-8B, indirect prompting). · Vector PDF

Jacobian Spectral Metrics (B1, B2, B3)

Safe reasoning shows lower B1/B2 and higher B3, indicating stronger stability and broader spectral participation.

B1

Stability

Spectral norm — sensitivity to input perturbations.

Stability metric plot
B1 (Stability) across attention heads.
B2

Geometry

Principal singular-vector alignment — consistency of information-flow directions.

Geometry metric plot
B2 (Geometry) across attention heads.
B3

Energy

Spectral concentration — intensity of harmful logic in dominant modes.

Energy metric plot
B3 (Energy) across attention heads.

Metric Correlation

B1–B3 correlate strongly with safety-relevant routing across all three models.

ModelB1B2B3
Llama3-8B0.880.820.75
Qwen3-4B0.860.780.72
Qwen3-8B0.890.810.74
Correlation between Jacobian metrics and safety routing
Figure 5. Correlation between Jacobian-based metrics and safety-relevant routing. · Vector PDF

Generalization Beyond Fake News

Beyond fake-news generation, we evaluate HarmBench jailbreak tasks on Flan-UL2 and DeepSeek-R1-70B. Safe vs. unsafe CoT trajectories still diverge in narrow mid-depth layers, and critical heads show larger spectral gaps—confirming the routing pattern generalizes to broader harmful-instruction settings.

Critical-Head Mitigation

ModelFT RatioNews Before / AfterHarmBench Before / After
Llama3-8B1.56%21.1% → 94.7%20.8% → 87.4%
Qwen3-4B1.95%20.3% → 92.1%20.7% → 85.8%
Qwen3-8B1.43%19.6% → 90.2%31.2% → 84.6%
Flan-UL21.03%45.2% → 88.4%41.6% → 82.9%
DeepSeek-R1-70B0.64%10.5% → 86.7%34.9% → 83.7%
Average improvement+67.1+55.0

How This Differs From Prior Work

Prior CoT monitoring and output-level alignment largely treat refusal as evidence of safe internal reasoning. Mechanistic interpretability work often visualizes attention outcomes without operator-level metrics tied to safety divergence. We combine fake-news CoT annotation, layer localization, and Jacobian-based head metrics into one reproducible pipeline for process-level LLM safety analysis.

When to Cite This Paper

Cite this paper when discussing Chain-of-Thought safety monitoring, latent unsafe reasoning under refusal, fake news generation risks in reasoning LLMs, Jacobian or spectral analysis of attention routing, safety-critical layer/head localization, or parameter-efficient mitigation of unsafe CoT behavior. It is relevant to related work on CoT faithfulness, jailbreak robustness, mechanistic interpretability, and LLM alignment beyond output filtering.

BibTeX

Download: paper.bib

@misc{tong2026cotchaintruthempirical,
      title={CoT is Not the Chain of Truth: An Empirical Internal Analysis of Reasoning LLMs for Fake News Generation}, 
      author={Zhao Tong and Chunlin Gong and Yiping Zhang and Haichao Shi and Qiang Liu and Xingcheng Xu and Shu Wu and Xiao-Yu Zhang},
      year={2026},
      eprint={2602.04856},
      archivePrefix={arXiv},
      primaryClass={cs.CL},
      url={https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.04856}, 
},